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Abstract
We present three new coordination mechanisms for scheduling n selfish jobs on m unrelated ma-
chines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency
of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy on each machine. The scheduling policies induce a
game among the jobs and each job prefers to be scheduled on a machine so that its completion time is
minimum given the assignments of the other jobs. We consider the maximum completion time among all
jobs as the measure of the efficiency of schedules. The approximation ratio of a coordination mechanism
quantifies the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria (price of anarchy) of the induced game.
Our mechanisms are deterministic, local, and preemptive in the sense that the scheduling policy does
not necessarily process the jobs in an uninterrupted way and may introduce some idle time. Our first
coordination mechanism has approximation ratio Θ(logm) and always guarantees that the induced game
has pure Nash equilibria to which the system converges in at most n rounds. This result improves a bound
of O(log2m) due to Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni and, similarly to their mechanism, our mechanism uses a
global ordering of the jobs according to their distinct IDs. Next we study the intriguing scenario where
jobs are anonymous, i.e., they have no IDs. In this case, coordination mechanisms can only distinguish
between jobs that have different load characteristics. Our second mechanism handles anonymous jobs
and has approximation ratio O
(
logm
log logm
)
although the game induced is not a potential game and, hence,
the existence of pure Nash equilibria is not guaranteed by potential function arguments. However, it
provides evidence that the known lower bounds for non-preemptive coordination mechanisms could be
beaten using preemptive scheduling policies. Our third coordination mechanism also handles anonymous
jobs and has a nice “cost-revealing” potential function. We use this potential function in order, not only
to prove the existence of equilibria, but also to upper-bound the price of stability of the induced game
by O(logm) and the price of anarchy by O(log2m). Our third coordination mechanism is the first that
handles anonymous jobs and simultaneously guarantees that the induced game is a potential game and
has bounded price of anarchy. In order to obtain the above bounds, our coordination mechanisms use m
as a parameter. Slight variations of these mechanisms in which this information is not necessary achieve
approximation ratios of O (mǫ), for any constant ǫ > 0.
∗A preliminary version of the results of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 815-824, 2009.
†Research Academic Computer Technology Institute & Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of
Patras, 26500 Rio, Greece. Email: caragian@ceid.upatras.gr.
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1 Introduction
We study the classical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. In this problem, we have m parallel
machines and n independent jobs. Job i induces a (possibly infinite) positive processing time (or load) wij
when processed by machine j. The load of a machine is the total load of the jobs assigned to it. The quality
of an assignment of jobs to machines is measured by the makespan (i.e., the maximum) of the machine loads
or, alternatively, the maximum completion time among all jobs. The optimization problem of computing an
assignment of minimum makespan is a fundamental APX-hard problem, quite well-understood in terms of
its offline [37] and online approximability [4, 9].
The approach we follow in this paper is both algorithmic and game-theoretic. We assume that each job
is owned by a selfish agent. This gives rise to a selfish scheduling setting where each agent aims to minimize
the completion time of her job with no regard to the global optimum. Such a selfish behaviour can lead to
inefficient schedules from which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate in order to improve the
completion time of her job. From the algorithmic point of view, the designer of such a system can define
a coordination mechanism [14], i.e., a scheduling policy within each machine in order to “coordinate” the
selfish behaviour of the jobs. Our main objective is to design coordination mechanisms that guarantee that
the assignments reached by the selfish agents are efficient.
The model. A scheduling policy simply defines the way jobs are scheduled within a machine and can
be either non-preemptive or preemptive. Non-preemptive scheduling policies process jobs uninterruptedly
according to some order. Preemptive scheduling policies do not necessarily have this feature and can also
introduce some idle time (delay). Although this seems unnecessary at first glance, as we show in this paper,
it is a very useful tool in order to guarantee coordination. A coordination mechanism is a set of scheduling
policies running on the machines. In the sequel, we use the terms coordination mechanisms and scheduling
policies interchangeably.
A coordination mechanism defines (or induces) a game with the job owners as players. Each job has all
machines as possible strategies. We call an assignment (of jobs to machines) or state any set of strategies
selected by the players, with one strategy per player. Given an assignment of jobs to machines, the cost
of a player is the completion time of her job on the machine it has been assigned to; this completion time
depends on the scheduling policy on that machine and the characteristics of all jobs assigned to that machine.
Assignments in which no player has an incentive to change her strategy in order to decrease her cost given
the assignments of the other players are called pure Nash equilibria. The global objective that is used
in order to assess the efficiency of assignments is the maximum completion time over all jobs. A related
quantity is the makespan (i.e., the maximum of the machine loads). Notice that when preemptive scheduling
policies are used, these two quantities may not be the same (since idle time contributes to the completion
time but not to the load of a machine). However, the optimal makespan is a lower bound on the optimal
maximum completion time. The price of anarchy [42] is the maximum over all pure Nash equilibria of the
ratio of the maximum completion time among all jobs over the optimal makespan. The price of stability [3]
is the minimum over all pure Nash equilibria of the ratio of the maximum completion time among all jobs
over the optimal makespan. The approximation ratio of a coordination mechanism is the maximum of the
price of anarchy of the induced game over all input instances.
Four natural coordination mechanisms are the Makespan, Randomized, LongestFirst, and Short-
estFirst. In the Makespan policy, each machine processes the jobs assigned to it “in parallel” so that the
completion time of each job is the total load of the machine. Makespan is obviously a preemptive coordi-
nation mechanism. In the Randomized policy, the jobs are scheduled non-preemptively in random order.
Here, the cost of each player is the expected completion time of her job. In the ShortestFirst and Longest-
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First policies, the jobs assigned to a machine are scheduled in non-decreasing and non-increasing order of
their processing times, respectively. In case of ties, a global ordering of the jobs according to their distinct
IDs is used. This is necessary by any deterministic non-preemptive coordination mechanism in order to
be well-defined. Note that no such information is required by the Makespan and Randomized policies;
in this case, we say that they handle anonymous jobs. According to the terminology of [8], all these four
coordination mechanisms are strongly local in the sense that the only information required by each machine
in order to compute a schedule are the processing times of the jobs assigned to it. A local coordination
mechanism may use all parameters (i.e., the load vector) of the jobs assigned to the same machine.
Designing coordination mechanisms with as small approximation ratio as possible is our main concern.
But there are other issues related to efficiency. The price of anarchy is meaningful only in games where
pure Nash equilibria exist. So, the primary goal of the designer of a coordination mechanism should be that
the induced game always has pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, these equilibria should be easy to find.
A very interesting class of games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed is that of
potential games. These games have the property that a potential function can be defined on the states of the
game so that in any two states differing in the strategy of a single player, the difference of the values of the
potential function and the difference of the cost of the player have the same sign. This property guarantees
that the state with minimum potential is a pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, it guarantees that, starting
from any state, the system will reach (converge to) a pure Nash equilibrium after a finite number of selfish
moves. Given a game, its Nash dynamics is a directed graph with the states of the game as nodes and edges
connecting two states differing in the strategy of a single player if that player has an incentive to change
her strategy according to the direction of the edge. The Nash dynamics of potential games do not contain
any cycle. Another desirable property here is fast convergence, i.e., convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium
in a polynomial number of selfish moves. A particular type of selfish moves that have been extensively
considered in the literature [6, 15, 22, 39] is that of best-response moves. In a best-response move, a player
having an incentive to change her strategy selects the strategy that yields the maximum decrease in her cost.
Potential games are strongly related to congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [43]. Rosenthal pre-
sented a potential function for these games with the following property: in any two states differing in the
strategy of a single player, the difference of the values of the potential function equals the difference of the
cost of the player. Monderer and Shapley [40] have proved that each potential game having this property
is isomorphic to a congestion game. We point out that potential functions are not the only way to guaran-
tee the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Several generalizations of congestion games such as those with
player-specific latency functions [38] are not potential games but several subclasses of them provably have
pure Nash equilibria.
Related work. The study of the price of anarchy of games began with the seminal work of Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [35] and has played a central role in the recently emerging field of Algorithmic Game
Theory [41]. Several papers provide bounds on the price of anarchy of different games of interest. Our work
follows a different direction where the price of anarchy is the objective to be minimized and, in this sense, it
is similar in spirit to studies where the main question is how to change the rules of the game at hand in order
to improve the price of anarchy. Typical examples are the introduction of taxes or tolls in congestion games
[11, 17, 24, 32, 51], protocol design in network and cost allocation games [12, 33], Stackelberg routing
strategies [31, 34, 36, 44, 51], and network design [45].
Coordination mechanisms were introduced by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Nanavati in [14]. They
study the case where each player has the same load on each machine and, among other results, they consider
the LongestFirst and ShortestFirst scheduling policies. We note that the Makespan and Randomized
scheduling policies were used in [35] as models of selfish behaviour in scheduling, and since that paper,
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the Makespan policy has been considered as standard in the study of selfish scheduling games in models
simpler than the one of unrelated machines and is strongly related to the study of congestion games (see
[52, 46] and the references therein). Immorlica et al. [29] study these four scheduling policies under several
scheduling settings including the most general case of unrelated machines. They prove that the Random-
ized and ShortestFirst policies have approximation ratio O(m) while the LongestFirst and Makespan
policies have unbounded approximation ratio. Some scheduling policies are also related to earlier studies
of local-search scheduling heuristics. So, the fact that the price of anarchy of the induced game may be
unbounded follows by the work of Schuurman and Vredeveld [48]. As observed in [29], the equilibria of
the game induced by ShortestFirst correspond to the solutions of the ShortestFirst scheduling heuristic
which is known to be m-approximate [28]. The Makespan policy is known to induce potential games [20].
The ShortestFirst policy also induces potential games as proved in [29]. In Section 4, we present examples
showing that the scheduling policies LongestFirst and Randomized do not induce potential games.1
Azar et al. [8] study non-preemptive coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. They
prove that any local non-preemptive coordination mechanism is at least Ω(logm)-approximate2 while any
strongly local non-preemptive coordination mechanism is at least Ω(m)-approximate; as a corollary, they
solve an old open problem concerning the approximation ratio of the ShortestFirst heuristic. On the pos-
itive side, the authors of [8] present a non-preemptive local coordination mechanism (henceforth called
AJM-1) that is O(logm)-approximate although it may induce games without pure Nash equilibria. The
extra information used by this scheduling policy is the inefficiency of jobs (defined in the next section).
They also present a technique that transforms this coordination mechanism to a preemptive one that induces
potential games with price of anarchy O(log2m). In their mechanism, the players converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium in n rounds of best-response moves. We will refer to this coordination mechanism as AJM-2.
Both AJM-1 and AJM-2 use the IDs of the jobs.
Our results. We present three new coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Our mech-
anisms are deterministic, preemptive, and local. The schedules in each machine are computed as functions
of the characteristics of jobs assigned to the machine, namely the load of jobs on the machine and their
inefficiency. In all cases, the functions use an integer parameter p ≥ 1; the best choice of this parameter for
our coordination mechanisms is p = O(logm). Our analysis is heavily based on the convexity of simple
polynomials and geometric inequalities for Euclidean norms.
Motivated by previous work, we first consider the scenario where jobs have distinct IDs. Our first coor-
dination mechanism ACOORD uses this information and is superior to the known coordination mechanisms
that induce games with pure Nash equilibria. The game induced is a potential game, has price of anarchy
Θ(logm), and the players converge to pure Nash equilibria in at most n rounds. Essentially, the equilibria of
the game induced by ACOORD can be thought of as the solutions produced by the application of a particu-
lar online algorithm, similar to the greedy online algorithm for minimizing the ℓp norm of the machine loads
[4, 10]. Interestingly, the local objective of the greedy online algorithm for the ℓp norm may not translate to
a completion time of jobs in feasible schedules; the online algorithm implicit by ACOORD uses a different
local objective that meets this constraint. The related results are presented in Section 3.
Next we address the case where no ID information is associated to the jobs (anonymous jobs). This
scenario is relevant when the job owners do not wish to reveal their identities or in large-scale settings
where distributing IDs to jobs is infeasible. Definitely, an advantage that could be used for coordination is
lost in this way but this makes the problem of designing coordination mechanisms more challenging. In
1After the appearance of the conference version of the paper, we became aware of two independent proofs that Longest-First
may induce games that do not have pure Nash equilibria [19, 23].
2The corresponding proof of [8] contained a error which has been recently fixed by Fleischer and Svitkina [25].
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Coordination
mechanism PoA Pot. PNE IDs Characteristics
ShortestFirst Θ(m) Yes Yes Yes Strongly local, non-preemptive
LongestFirst unbounded No No Yes Strongly local, non-preemptive
Makespan unbounded Yes Yes No Strongly local, preemptive
Randomized Θ(m) No ? No Strongly local, non-preemptive
AJM-1 Θ(logm) No No Yes Local, non-preemptive
AJM-2 O(log2 m) Yes Yes Yes Local, preemptive, uses m
ACOORD Θ(logm) Yes Yes Yes Local, preemptive, uses m
O(mǫ) Yes Yes Yes Local, preemptive
BCOORD O
(
logm
log logm
)
No ? No Local, preemptive, uses m
O(mǫ) No ? No Local, preemptive
CCOORD O(log2 m) Yes Yes No Local, preemptive, uses m
O(mǫ) Yes Yes No Local, preemptive
Table 1: Comparison of our coordination mechanisms to previously known ones with respect to the price
of anarchy of the induced game (PoA), whether they induced potential games or not (Pot.), the existence of
pure Nash equilibria (PNE), and whether they use the job IDs or not.
Section 4, we present our second coordination mechanism BCOORD which induces a simple congestion
game with player-specific polynomial latency functions of a particular form. The price of anarchy of this
game is only O
(
logm
log logm
)
. This result demonstrates that preemption may be useful in order to beat the
Ω(logm) lower bound of [8] for non-preemptive coordination mechanisms. On the negative side, we show
that the game induced may not be a potential game by presenting an example where the Nash dynamics have
a cycle.
Our third coordination mechanism CCOORD is presented in Section 5. The scheduling policy on each
machine uses an interesting function on the loads of the jobs assigned to the machine and their inefficiency.
The game induced by CCOORD is a potential game; the associated potential function is “cost-revealing”
in the sense that it can be used to upper-bound the cost of equilibria. In particular, we show that the price
of stability of the induced game is O(logm) and the price of anarchy is O(log2m). The coordination
mechanism CCOORD is the first that handles anonymous jobs and simultaneously guarantees that the
induced game is a potential game and has bounded price of anarchy. Table 1 compares our coordination
mechanisms to the previously known ones.
Observe that the dependence of the parameter p on m requires that our mechanisms use the number
of machines as input. By setting p equal to an appropriately large constant, our mechanisms achieve price
of anarchy O(mǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0. In particular, the coordination mechanisms ACOORD and
CCOORD are the first ones that do not use the number of machines as a parameter, induce games with pure
Nash equilibria, and have price of anarchy o(m).
We remark that the current paper contains several improvements compared to its conference version.
There, the three coordination mechanisms had the restriction that a job with inefficiency more than m on
some machine has infinite completion time when assigned to that machine. Here, we have removed this
restriction and have adapted the analysis accordingly. A nice consequence of the new definition is that the
coordination mechanisms can now be defined so that they do not use the number of machines as a parameter.
Furthermore, the definition of ACOORD has been significantly simplified. Also, the analysis of the price
of anarchy of the coordination mechanism BCOORD in the conference version used a technical lemma
which is implicit in [50]. In the current version, we present a different self-contained proof that is based on
convexity properties of polynomials and Minkowski inequality; the new proof has a similar structure with
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the analysis of the price of anarchy of mechanism ACOORD.
We begin with preliminary technical definitions in Section 2 and conclude with interesting open ques-
tions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present our notation and give some statements that will be useful later. We reserve n
and m for the number of jobs and machines, respectively, and the indices i and j for jobs and machines,
respectively. Unless specified otherwise, the sums
∑
i and
∑
j run over all jobs and over all machines,
respectively. Assignments are denoted by N or O. With some abuse in notation, we use Nj to denote both
the set of jobs assigned to machine j and the set of their loads on machine j. We use the notation L(Nj)
to denote the load of machine j under the assignment N . More generally, L(A) denotes the sum of the
elements for any set of non-negative reals A. For an assignment N which assigns job i to machine j, we
denote the completion time of job i under a given scheduling policy by P(i,Nj). Note that, besides defining
the completion times, we do not discuss the particular way the jobs are scheduled by the scheduling policies
we present. However, we require that feasible schedules are computable efficiently. A natural sufficient and
necessary condition is the following: for any job i ∈ Nj , the total load of jobs with completion time at most
P(i,Nj) is at most P(i,Nj).
Our three coordination mechanisms use the inefficiency of jobs in order to compute schedules. We
denote by wi,min the minimum load of job i over all machines. Then, its inefficiency ρij on machine j is
defined as ρij = wij/wi,min.
Our proofs are heavily based on the convexity of simple polynomials such as zk for k ≥ 1 and on the
relation of Euclidean norms of the machine loads and the makespan. Recall that the ℓk norm of the machine
loads for an assignment N is
(∑
j L(Nj)
k
)1/k
. The proof of the next lemma is trivial.
Lemma 1 For any assignment N , maxj L(Nj) ≤
(∑
j L(Nj)
k
)1/k ≤ m1/k maxj L(Nj).
In some of the proofs, we also use the Minkowski inequality (or the triangle inequality for the ℓp norm).
Lemma 2 (Minkowski inequality)
(∑s
t=1 (at + bt)
k
)1/k ≤ (∑st=1 akt )1/k + (∑st=1 bkt )1/k, for any k ≥
1 and at, bt ≥ 0.
The following two technical lemmas are used in some of our proofs. We include them here for easy
reference.
Lemma 3 Let r ≥ 1, t ≥ 0 and ai ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., k. Then,
k∑
i=1
((t+ ai)
r − tr) ≤
(
t+
k∑
i=1
ai
)r
− tr
Proof. The case when ai = 0 for i = 1, ..., k is trivial. Assume otherwise and let ξ =
∑k
i=1 ai and
ξi = ai/ξ. Clearly,
∑k
i=1 ξi = 1. By the convexity of function zr in [0,∞), we have that
(t+ ai)
r =
(
(1− ξi)t+ ξi
(
t+
k∑
i=1
ai
))r
≤ (1− ξi)tr + ξi
(
t+
k∑
i=1
ai
)r
(1)
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for i = 1, ..., k. Using (1), we obtain
k∑
i=1
((t+ ai)
r − tr) ≤ tr
(
k∑
i=1
(1− ξi)− k
)
+
(
t+
k∑
i=1
ai
)r k∑
i=1
ξi
=
(
t+
k∑
i=1
ai
)r
− tr
Lemma 4 For any z0 ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, and p ≥ 1, it holds
(p + 1)αzp0 ≤ (z0 + α)p+1 − zp+10 ≤ (p + 1)α(z0 + α)p.
Proof. The inequality trivially holds if α = 0. If α > 0, the inequality follows since, due to the convexity
of the function zp+1, the slope of the line that crosses points (z0, zp+10 ) and (z0+α, (z0+α)p+1) is between
its derivative at points z0 and z0 + α.
We also refer to the multinomial and binomial theorems. [27] provides an extensive overview of the
inequalities we use and their history (see also wikipedia.org for a quick survey).
3 The coordination mechanism ACOORD
The coordination mechanism ACOORD uses a global ordering of the jobs according to their distinct IDs.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the index of a job is its ID. Let N be an assignment and
denote by N i the restriction of N to the jobs with the i smallest IDs. ACOORD schedules job i on machine
j so that it completes at time
P(i,Nj) = (ρij)1/p L(N ij).
Since ρij ≥ 1, the schedules produced are always feasible.
Consider the sequence of jobs in increasing order of their IDs and assume that each job plays a best-
response move. In this case, job i will select that machine j so that the quantity (ρij)1/p L(N ij) is minimized.
Since the completion time of job i depends only on jobs with smaller IDs, no job will have an incentive to
change its strategy and the resulting assignment is a pure Nash equilibrium. The following lemma extends
this observation in a straightforward way.
Lemma 5 The game induced by the coordination mechanism ACOORD is a potential game. Furthermore,
any sequence of n rounds of best-response moves converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Notice that since a job does not affect the completion time of jobs with smaller IDs, the vector of
completion times of the jobs (sorted in increasing order of their IDs) decreases lexicographically when a job
improves its cost by deviating to another strategy and, hence, it is a potential function for the game induced
by the coordination mechanism ACOORD.
Now, consider n rounds of best-response moves of the jobs in the induced game such that each job plays
at least once in each round. It is not hard to see that after round i, the job i will have selected that machine
j so that the quantity (ρij)1/p L(N ij) is minimized. Since the completion time of job i depends only on jobs
with smaller IDs, job i has no incentive to move after round i and, hence, no job will have an incentive to
change its strategy after the n rounds. So, the resulting assignment is a pure Nash equilibrium.
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The sequence of best-response moves mentioned above can be thought of as an online algorithm that
processes the jobs in increasing order of their IDs. The local objective is slightly different that the local
objective of the greedy online algorithm for minimizing the ℓp+1 norm of the machine loads [7, 10]; in
that algorithm, job i is assigned to a machine j so that the quantity (L(N i−1j ) + wij)p+1 − L(N i−1j )p+1 is
minimized. Here, we remark that we do not see how the local objective of that algorithm could be simulated
by a scheduling policy that always produces feasible schedules. This constraint is trivially satisfied by the
coordination mechanism ACOORD. The next lemma bounds the maximum completion time at pure Nash
equilibria in terms of the ℓp+1 norm of the machine loads and the optimal makespan.
Lemma 6 Let N be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the coordination mechanisms ACO-
ORD and let O be an optimal assignment. Then
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj).
Proof. Let i∗ be the job that has the maximum completion time in assignment N . Denote by j1 the machine
i∗ uses in N and let j2 be a machine such that ρi∗j2 = 1. If j1 = j2, the definition of the coordination
mechanism ACOORD yields
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
= L(N i
∗
j1 )
≤ L(Nj1)
≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
.
Otherwise, since player i∗ has no incentive to use machine j2 instead of j1, we have
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
≤ P(i∗, Nj2 ∪ {wi∗j2})
= L(N i
∗
j2 ) + wi∗j2
≤ L(Nj2) + min
j
wi∗j
≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj).
Next we show that the approximation ratio of ACOORD is O(logm) (for well-selected values of the
parameter p). The analysis borrows and extends techniques from the analysis of the greedy online algorithm
for the ℓp norm in [10].
Theorem 7 The price of anarchy of the game induced by the coordination mechanism ACOORD with
p = Θ(logm) is O(logm). Also, for every constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2], the price of anarchy of the game induced
by the coordination mechanism ACOORD with p = 1/ǫ− 1 is O (mǫ).
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Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium N and an optimal assignment O. Since no job has an incentive
to change her strategy from N , for any job i that is assigned to machine j1 in N and to machine j2 in O, by
the definition of ACOORD we have that
(ρij1)
1/p L(N ij1) ≤ (ρij2)1/p
(
L(N i−1j2 ) + wij2
)
.
Equivalently, by raising both sides to the power p and multiplying with wi,min, we have that
wij1L(N
i
j1)
p ≤ wij2
(
L(N i−1j2 ) + wij2
)p
.
Using the binary variables xij and yij to denote whether job i is assigned to machine j in the assignment
N (xij = 1) and O (yij = 1), respectively, or not (xij = 0 and yij = 0, respectively), we can express this
last inequality as follows.
∑
j
xijwijL(N
i
j)
p ≤
∑
j
yijwij
(
L(N i−1j ) + wij
)p
By summing over all jobs and multiplying with (e− 1)(p + 1), we have
(e− 1)(p + 1)
∑
i
∑
j
xijwijL(N
i
j)
p
≤ (e− 1)(p + 1)
∑
i
∑
j
yijwij
(
L(N i−1j ) + wij
)p
≤ (e− 1)(p + 1)
∑
j
∑
i
yijwij (L(Nj) + wij)
p
= (e− 1)(p + 1)
∑
j
∑
i
yijwij (L(Nj) + yijwij)
p
≤
∑
j
∑
i
(
(L(Nj) + eyijwij)
p+1 − (L(Nj) + yijwij)p+1
)
≤
∑
j
∑
i
(
(L(Nj) + eyijwij)
p+1 − L(Nj)p+1
)
≤
∑
j

(L(Nj) + e∑
i
yijwij
)p+1
− L(Nj)p+1


=
∑
j
(L(Nj) + eL(Oj))
p+1 −
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1
≤



∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+ e

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1


p+1
−
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1. (2)
The second inequality follows by exchanging the sums and since L(N i−1j ) ≤ L(Nj), the first equality
follows since yij ∈ {0, 1}, the third inequality follows by applying Lemma 4 with α = (e − 1)yijwij
and z0 = L(Nj) + yijwij , the fourth inequality is obvious, the fifth inequality follows by Lemma 3, the
second equality follows since the definition of the variables yij implies that L(Oj) =
∑
i yijwij , and the
last inequality follows by Minkowski inequality (Lemma 2).
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Now, we will relate the ℓp+1 norm of the machines loads of assignments N and O. We have
(e− 1)
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1 = (e− 1)
∑
j
L(Nnj )
p+1
= (e− 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j
(
L(N ij)
p+1 − L(N i−1j )p+1
)
= (e− 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j
(
L(N ij)
p+1 − (L(N ij)− xijwij)p+1
)
≤ (e− 1)(p + 1)
∑
i
∑
j
xijwijL(N
i
j)
p
≤



∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+ e

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1


p+1
−
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1.
The first two equalities are obvious (observe that L(N0j ) = 0), the third one follows by the definition of
variables xij , the first inequality follows by applying Lemma 4 with α = xijwij and z0 = L(N ij)− xijwij ,
and the last inequality follows by inequality (2).
So, the above inequality yields

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ e
e
1
p+1 − 1

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ e(p + 1)

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ e(p + 1)m 1p+1 max
j
L(Oj).
The second inequality follows since ez ≥ z + 1 for z ≥ 0 and the third one follows by Lemma 1.
Now, using Lemma 6 and this last inequality, we obtain that
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj)
≤
(
e(p + 1)m
1
p+1 + 1
)
max
j
L(Oj).
The desired bounds follow by setting p = Θ(logm) and p = 1/ǫ− 1, respectively.
Our logarithmic bound is asymptotically tight; this follows by the connection to online algorithms mentioned
above and the lower bound of [9].
4 The coordination mechanism BCOORD
We now turn our attention to coordination mechanisms that handle anonymous jobs. We define the coordi-
nation mechanism BCOORD by slightly changing the definition of ACOORD so that the completion time
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of a job does not depend on its ID. So, BCOORD schedules job i on machine j so that it finishes at time
P(i,Nj) = (ρij)1/p L(Nj).
Since ρij ≥ 1, the schedules produced are always feasible. The next lemma bounds the maximum com-
pletion time at pure Nash equilibria (again in terms of the ℓp+1 norm of the machine loads and the optimal
makespan).
Lemma 8 Let N be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the coordination mechanisms BCO-
ORD and let O be an optimal assignment. Then
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 6; we include it here for completeness. Let i∗
be the job that has the maximum completion time in assignment N . Denote by j1 the machine i∗ uses in
N and let j2 be a machine such that ρi∗j2 = 1. If j1 = j2, the definition of the coordination mechanism
BCOORD yields
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
= L(Nj1)
≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
.
Otherwise, since player i∗ has no incentive to use machine j2 instead of j1, we have
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
≤ P(i∗, Nj2 ∪ {wi∗j2})
= L(Nj2) + wi∗j2
= L(Nj2) + min
j
wi∗j
≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj).
We are ready to present our upper bounds on the price of anarchy of the induced game.
Theorem 9 The price of anarchy of the game induced by the coordination mechanism BCOORD with
p = Θ(logm) is O
(
logm
log logm
)
. Also, for every constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2], the price of anarchy of the game
induced by the coordination mechanism BCOORD with p = 1/ǫ− 1 is O (mǫ).
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Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium N and an optimal assignment O. Since no job has an incentive
to change her strategy from N , for any job i that is assigned to machine j1 in N and to machine j2 in O, we
have that
(ρij1)
1/pL(Nj1) ≤ (ρij2)1/p(L(Nj2) + wij2).
Equivalently, by raising both sides to the power p and multiplying both sides with wi,min, we have that
wij1L(Nj1)
p ≤ wij2(L(Nj2) + wij2)p.
Using the binary variables xij and yij to denote whether job i is assigned to machine j in the assignments
N (xij = 1) and O (yij = 1), respectively, or not (xij = 0 and yij = 0, respectively), we can express this
last inequality as follows: ∑
j
xijwijL(Nj)
p ≤
∑
j
yijwij(L(Nj) + wij)
p.
By summing over all jobs and multiplying with p, we have
p
∑
i
∑
j
xijwijL(Nj)
p
≤ p
∑
i
∑
j
yijwij(L(Nj) + wij)
p
= p
∑
j
∑
i
yijwij(L(Nj) + yijwij)
p
≤
∑
j
∑
i
((
L(Nj) +
2p + 1
p+ 1
yijwij
)p+1
− (L(Nj) + yijwij)p+1
)
≤
∑
j
∑
i
((
L(Nj) +
2p + 1
p+ 1
yijwij
)p+1
− L(Nj)p+1
)
≤
∑
j

(L(Nj) + 2p+ 1
p+ 1
∑
i
yijwij
)p+1
− L(Nj)p+1


=
∑
j
((
L(Nj) +
2p + 1
p+ 1
L(Oj)
)p+1
− L(Nj)p+1
)
≤



∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+
2p + 1
p+ 1

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1


p+1
−
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1 (3)
The first equality follows by exchanging the sums and since yij ∈ {0, 1}, the second inequality follows by
applying Lemma 4 with α = pp+1yijwij and z0 = L(Nj)+yijwij , the third inequality is obvious, the fourth
inequality follows by applying Lemma 3, the second equality follows since the definition of variables yij
implies that L(Oj) =
∑
i yijwij , and the last inequality follows by applying Minkowski inequality (Lemma
2).
Now, we relate the ℓp+1 norm of the machine loads of assignments N and O. We have
(p+ 1)
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1 = p
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1 +
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1
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= p
∑
i
∑
j
xijwijL(Nj)
p +
∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1
≤



∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+
2p+ 1
p+ 1

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1


p+1
.
The first equality is obvious, the second one follows by the definition of variables xij and the inequality
follows by inequality (3).
So, the above inequalities yield

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ 2p+ 1
p+ 1
1
(p+ 1)
1
p+1 − 1

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ 2p+ 1
ln (p+ 1)

∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1
≤ 2p+ 1
ln (p+ 1)
m
1
p+1 max
j
L(Oj).
The second inequality follows since ez ≥ z + 1 for z ≥ 0 and the third one follows by Lemma 1.
Now, using Lemma 8 and our last inequality we have
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤

∑
j
L(Nj)
p+1


1
p+1
+max
j
L(Oj)
≤
(
1 +
2p + 1
ln (p + 1)
m
1
p+1
)
max
j
L(Oj).
The desired bounds follows by setting p = Θ(logm) and p = 1/ǫ− 1, respectively.
Note that the game induced by BCOORD with p = 1 is the same with the game induced by the
coordination mechanism CCOORD (with p = 1) that we present in the next section. As such, it also
has a potential function (also similar to the potential function of [26] for linear weighted congestion games)
as we will see in Lemma 13. In this way, we obtain a coordination mechanism that induces a potential game,
handles anonymous jobs, and has aproximation ratio O(√m). Unfortunately, the next theorem demonstrates
that, for higher values of p, the Nash dynamics of the game induced by BCOORD may contain a cycle.
Theorem 10 The game induced by the coordination mechanism BCOORD with p = 2 is not a potential
game.
Before proving Theorem 10, we show that the games induced by the coordination mechanisms Longest-
First and Randomized may not be potential games either. All the instances presented in the following
consist of four machines and three basic jobs A, B, and C . In each case, we show that the Nash dynamics
contain a cycle of moves of the three basic jobs.
First consider the LongestFirst policy and the instance depicted in the following table.
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A B C
1 14 ∞ 5
2 ∞ 10 ∞
3 3 9 10
4 7 8 9
The cycle is defined on the following states:
(C,B,A, )→ (C, ,AB, )→ (C, ,B,A)→ (C, , , AB)→ (AC, , ,B)→
(A, ,C,B) → (, , AC,B)→ (, , A,BC)→ (, B,A,C)→ (C,B,A, ).
Notice that the first and last assignment are the same. In each state, the player that moves next is underlined.
Job B is at machine 2 in the first assignment and has completion time 10. Hence, it has an incentive to
move to machine 3 (second assignment) where its completion time is 9. Job A has completion time 12 in
the second assignment since it is scheduled after job B which has higher load on machine 3. Moving to
machine 4 (third assignment), it decreases its completion time to 7. The remaining moves in the cycle can
be verified accordingly.
The instance for the Randomized policy contains four additional jobs D, E, F , and G which are always
scheduled on machines 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively (i.e., they have infinite load on the other machines). It is
depicted in the following table.
A B C D E F G
1 80 ∞ 100 2 ∞ ∞ ∞
2 ∞ 171 ∞ ∞ 2 ∞ ∞
3 2 154 124 ∞ ∞ 32 ∞
4 2 76 10 ∞ ∞ ∞ 184
The cycle is defined by the same moves of the basic jobs as in the case of LongestFirst:
(CD,BE,AF,G) → (CD,E,ABF,G)→ (CD,E,BF,AG) → (CD,E,F,ABG)→
(ACD,E,F,BG) → (AD,E,CF,BG) → (D,E,ACF,BG)→ (D,E,AF,BCG)→
(D,BE,AF,CG)→ (CD,BE,AF,G).
Recall that (see [29, 35]) the expected completion time of a job i which is scheduled on machine j in an
assignment N is 12 (wij + L(Nj)) when the Randomized policy is used. In each state, the player that
moves next is underlined. It can be easily verified that each player in this cycle improves her cost by exactly
1. For example, job B has expected completion time 12(171 + 171 + 2) = 172 at machine 2 in the first
assignment and, hence, an incentive to move to machine 3 in the second assignment where its completion
time is 12(154 + 2 + 154 + 32) = 171.
Proof of Theorem 10. Besides the three basic jobs, the instance for the BCOORD policy with p = 2
contains two additional jobs D and E which are always scheduled on machines 3 and 4, respectively. The
instance is depicted in the following table.
A B C D E
1 4.0202 ∞ 4.0741 ∞ ∞
2 ∞ 8.2481 ∞ ∞ ∞
3 0.0745 0.6302 0.3078 29.1331 ∞
4 2.4447 5.1781 2.4734 ∞ 2.7592
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The cycle is defined by the same moves of the basic jobs as in the previous cases:
(C,B,AD,E) → (C, ,ABD,E)→ (C, ,BD,AE) → (C, ,D,ABE)→ (AC, ,D,BE)→
(A, ,CD,BE)→ (, , ACD,BE)→ (, , AD,BCE)→ (, B,AD,CE)→ (C,B,AD,E).
Notice that, instead of considering the completion time (ρij)1/p L(Nj) of a job i on machine j in an as-
signment N , it is equivalent to consider its cost as wijL(Nj)p. In this way, we can verify that in any of the
moves in the above cycle, the job that moves improves its cost. For example, job B has cost 8.24813 =
561.127758090641 on machine 2 in the first assignment and cost 0.6302(0.0745 + 0.6302 + 29.1331)2 =
561.063473430968 on machine 3 in the second assignment.
5 The coordination mechanism CCOORD
In this section we present and analyze the coordination mechanism CCOORD that handles anonymous jobs
and guarantees that the induced game has pure Nash equilibria, price of anarchy at most O(log2m), and
price of stability O(logm). In order to define the scheduling policy, we first define an interesting family of
functions.
Definition 11 For integer k ≥ 0, the function Ψk mapping finite sets of reals to the reals is defined as
follows: Ψk(∅) = 0 for any integer k ≥ 1, Ψ0(A) = 1 for any (possibly empty) set A, and for any
non-empty set A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and integer k ≥ 1,
Ψk(A) = k!
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
k∏
t=1
adt .
So, Ψk(A) is essentially the sum of all possible monomials of total degree k on the elements of A. Each
term in the sum has coefficient k!. Clearly, Ψ1(A) = L(A). For k ≥ 2, compare Ψk(A) with L(A)k which
can also be expressed as the sum of the same terms, albeit with different coefficients in {1, ..., k!}, given by
the multinomial theorem.
The coordination mechanism CCOORD schedules job i on machine j in an assignment N so that its
completion time is
P(i,Nj) = (ρijΨp(Nj))1/p .
Our proofs extensively use the properties in the next lemma; its proof is given in appendix. The first
inequality implies that the schedule defined by CCOORD is always feasible.
Lemma 12 For any integer k ≥ 1, any finite set of non-negative reals A, and any non-negative real b the
following hold:
a. L(A)k ≤ Ψk(A) ≤ k!L(A)k d. Ψk(A ∪ {b})−Ψk(A) = kbΨk−1(A ∪ {b})
b. Ψk−1(A)k ≤ Ψk(A)k−1 e. Ψk(A) ≤ kL(A)Ψk−1(A)
c. Ψk(A ∪ {b}) =
∑k
t=0
k!
(k−t)!b
tΨk−t(A) f. Ψk(A ∪ {b}) ≤
(
Ψk(A)
1/k +Ψk({b})1/k
)k
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The second property implies that Ψk(A)1/k ≤ Ψk′(A)1/k′ for any integer k′ ≥ k. The third property
suggests an algorithm for computing Ψk(A) in time polynomial in k and |A| using dynamic programming.
A careful examination of the definitions of the coordination mechanisms BCOORD and CCOORD
and property (a) in the above lemma, reveals that CCOORD makes the completion time of a job assigned
to machine j dependent on the approximation Ψp(Nj)1/p of the load L(Nj) of the machine instead of its
exact load as BCOORD does. This will be the crucial tool in order to guarantee that the induced game is
a potential game without significantly increasing the price of anarchy. The next lemma defines a potential
function on the states of the induced game that will be very useful later.
Lemma 13 The function Φ(N) = ∑j Ψp+1(Nj) is a potential function for the game induced by the coor-
dination mechanism CCOORD. Hence, this game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider two assignments N and N ′ differing in the strategy of the player controlling job i. Assume
that job i is assigned to machine j1 in N and to machine j2 6= j1 in N ′. Observe that Nj1 = N ′j1 ∪ {wij1}
and N ′j2 = Nj2 ∪ {wij2}. By Lemma 12d, we have that Ψp+1(Nj1) − Ψp+1(N ′j1) = (p + 1)wij1Ψp(Nj1)
and Ψp+1(N ′j2) − Ψp+1(Nj2) = (p + 1)wij2Ψp(N ′j2). Using these properties and the definitions of the
coordination mechanism CCOORD and function Φ, we have
Φ(N)− Φ(N ′) =
∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)−
∑
j
Ψp+1(N
′
j)
= Ψp+1(Nj1) + Ψp+1(Nj2)−Ψp+1(N ′j1)−Ψp+1(N ′j2)
= (p+ 1)wij1Ψp(Nj1)− (p+ 1)wij2Ψp(N ′j2)
= (p+ 1)wi,min
(
P(i,Nj1)p − P(i,N ′j2)p
)
which means that the difference of the potentials of the two assignments and the difference of the completion
time of player i have the same sign as desired.
The next lemma relates the maximum completion time of a pure Nash equilibrium to the optimal
makespan provided that their potentials are close.
Lemma 14 Let O be an optimal assignment and let N be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game induced by
the coordination mechanism CCOORD such that (Φ(N))
1
p+1 ≤ γ (Φ(O)) 1p+1 . Then,
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤
(
γ(p + 1)m
1
p+1 + p
)
max
j
L(Oj).
Proof. Let i∗ be the job that has the maximum completion time in N . Denote by j1 the machine i∗ uses in
assignments N and let j2 be a machine such that ρi∗j2 = 1. If j1 = j2, the definition of the coordination
mechanism CCOORD and Lemma 12b yield
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
= Ψp(Nj1)
1/p
≤ Ψp+1(Nj1)
1
p+1
≤

∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)


1
p+1
. (4)
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Otherwise, since player i has no incentive to use machine j2 instead of j1, we have
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) = P(i∗, Nj1)
≤ P(i∗, Nj2 ∪ {wi∗j2})
= Ψp(Nj2 ∪ {wi∗j2})1/p
≤ Ψp(Nj2)1/p +Ψp({wi∗j2})1/p
≤ Ψp+1(Nj2)
1
p+1 + (p!)1/pwi∗j2
= Ψp+1(Nj2)
1
p+1 + (p!)1/p min
j
wi∗j
≤

∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)


1
p+1
+ pmax
j
L(Oj). (5)
The first two equalities follows by the definition of CCOORD, the first inequality follows since player
i∗ has no incentive to use machine j2 instead of j1, the second inequality follows by Lemma 12f, the
third inequality follows by Lemma 12b and the definition of function Ψp, the third equality follows by the
definition of machine j2 and the last inequality is obvious.
Now, observe that the term in parenthesis in the rightmost side of inequalities (4) and (5) equals the
potential Φ(N). Hence, in any case, we have
max
j,i∈Nj
P(i,Nj) ≤ (Φ(N))
1
p+1 + pmax
j
L(Oj)
≤ γ(Φ(O)) 1p+1 + pmax
j
L(Oj)
= γ

∑
j
Ψp+1(Oj)


1
p+1
+ pmax
j
L(Oj)
≤ γ

(p + 1)!∑
j
L(Oj)
p+1


1
p+1
+ pmax
j
L(Oj)
≤
(
γ(p + 1)m
1
p+1 + p
)
max
j
L(Oj).
The second inequality follows by the inequality on the potentials of assignments N and O, the equality
follows by the definition of the potential function Φ, the third inequality follows by Lemma 12a and the last
one follows by Lemma 1.
A first application of Lemma 14 is in bounding the price of stability of the induced game.
Theorem 15 The game induced by the coordination mechanism CCOORD with p = Θ(logm) has price
of stability at most O(logm).
Proof. Consider the optimal assignment O and the pure Nash equilibrium N of minimum potential. We
have (Φ(N))
1
p+1 ≤ (Φ(O)) 1p+1 and, using Lemma 14, we obtain that the maximum completion time in N
is at most (p + 1)m
1
p+1 + p times the makespan of O. Setting p = Θ(logm), the theorem follows.
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A second application of Lemma 14 is in bounding the price of anarchy. In order to apply it, we need a
relation between the potential of an equilibrium and the potential of an optimal assignment; this is provided
by the next lemma.
Lemma 16 Let O be an optimal assignment and N be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the
coordination mechanism CCOORD. Then,
(Φ(N))
1
p+1 ≤ p+ 1
ln 2
(Φ(O))
1
p+1 .
Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium N and an optimal assignment O. Since no job has an incentive
to change her strategy from N , for any job i that is assigned to machine j1 in N and to machine j2 in O, we
have that
(ρij1Ψp(Nj1))
1/p ≤ (ρij2Ψp(Nj2 ∪ {wij2}))1/p .
Equivalently, by raising both sides to the power p and multiplying both sides with wi,min, we have that
wij1Ψp(Nj1) ≤ wij2Ψ(Nj2 ∪ {wij2}).
Using the binary variables xij and yij to denote whether job i is assigned to machine j in the assignment N
(xij = 1) and O (yij = 1) or not (xij = 0 and yij = 0, respectively), we can express the last inequality as
follows: ∑
j
xijwijΨp(Nj) ≤
∑
j
yijwijΨ(Nj ∪ {wij})
By summing over all jobs, we have∑
i
∑
j
xijwijΨp(Nj) ≤
∑
i
∑
j
yijwijΨ(Nj ∪ {wij})
By exchanging the double sums and since
∑
i xijwij = L(Nj), we obtain∑
j
L(Nj)Ψp(Nj) ≤
∑
j
∑
i
yijwijΨp(Nj ∪ {wij}) (6)
We now work with the potential of assignment N . We have
2Φ(N) = Φ(N) +
∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)
≤ Φ(N) + (p+ 1)
∑
j
L(Nj)Ψp(Nj)
≤ Φ(N) + (p+ 1)
∑
j
∑
i
yijwijΨp(Nj ∪ {wij})
= Φ(N) + (p+ 1)
∑
j
∑
i
yijwij
p∑
t=0
p!
(p− t)!Ψp−t(Nj)w
t
ij
= Φ(N) +
∑
j
p∑
t=0
(p+ 1)!
(p − t)! Ψp−t(Nj)
∑
i
yijw
t+1
ij
18
≤ Φ(N) +
∑
j
p∑
t=0
(p + 1)!
(p− t)!(t+ 1)!Ψp−t(Nj)Ψt+1(Oj)
= Φ(N) +
∑
j
p+1∑
t=1
(
p+ 1
t
)
Ψp+1−t(Nj)Ψt(Oj)
≤ Φ(N) +
∑
j
p+1∑
t=1
(
p+ 1
t
)
Ψp+1(Nj)
p+1−t
p+1 Ψp+1(Oj)
t
p+1
= Φ(N) +
∑
j
((
Ψp+1(Nj)
1
p+1 +Ψp+1(Oj)
1
p+1
)p+1
−Ψp+1(Nj)
)
= Φ(N) +
∑
j
(
Ψp+1(Nj)
1
p+1 +Ψp+1(Oj)
1
p+1
)p+1 −∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)
≤



∑
j
Ψp+1(Nj)


1
p+1
+

∑
j
Ψp+1(Oj)


1
p+1


p+1
=
(
(Φ(N))
1
p+1 + (Φ(O))
1
p+1
)p+1
The first inequality follows by Lemma 12e, the second inequality follows by inequality (6), the second
equality follows by Lemma 12c, the third equality follows by exchanging the sums, the third inequality
follows since the jobs i assigned to machine j are those for which yij = 1 and by the definition of function
Ψt+1 which yields that Ψt+1(Oj) ≥ (t+ 1)!∑i yijwt+1ij , the fourth equality follows by updating the limits
of the sum over t, the fourth inequality follows by Lemma 12b, the fifth equality follows by the binomial
theorem, the sixth equality is obvious, the fifth inequality follows by Minkowski inequality (Lemma 2) and
by the definition of the potential Φ(N), and the last equality follows by the definition of the potentials Φ(N)
and Φ(O).
By the above inequality, we obtain that
(Φ(N))
1
p+1 ≤ 1
2
1
p+1 − 1
(Φ(O))
1
p+1 ≤ p+ 1
ln 2
(Φ(O))
1
p+1
where the last inequality follows using the inequality ez ≥ z + 1.
We are now ready to bound the price of anarchy.
Theorem 17 The price of anarchy of the game induced by the coordination mechanism CCOORD with
p = Θ(logm) is O
(
log2m
)
. Also, for every constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2], the price of anarchy of the game
induced by the coordination mechanism CCOORD with p = 1/ǫ− 1 is O (mǫ).
Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium N and let O be the optimal assignment. Using Lemma 16, we
have that (Φ(N))
1
p+1 ≤ p+1ln 2 (Φ(O))
1
p+1
. Hence, by Lemma 14, we obtain that the maximum completion
time in N is at most (p+1)
2
ln 2 m
1
p+1 + p times the makespan of O. By setting p = Θ(logm) and p = 1/ǫ− 1,
respectively, the theorem follows.
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6 Discussion and open problems
Our focus in the current paper has been on pure Nash equilibria. It is also interesting to generalize the
bounds on the price of anarchy of the games induced by our coordination mechanisms for mixed Nash
equilibria. Recently, Roughgarden [47] defined general smoothness arguments that can be used to bound
the price of anarchy of games having particular properties. Bounds on the price of anarchy over pure Nash
equilibria that are proved using smoothness arguments immediately imply that the same bounds on the price
of anarchy hold for mixed Nash equilibria as well. We remark that the arguments used in the current paper
in order to prove our upper bounds are not smoothness arguments. At least in the case of the coordination
mechanism BCOORD, smoothness arguments cannot be used to prove a bound on the price of anarchy as
small as O
(
logm
log logm
)
since the price of anarchy over mixed Nash equilibria is provably higher in the case.
We demonstrate this using the following construction. Czumaj and Voecking [18] present a game induced
by the Makespan policy on related machines which has price of anarchy over mixed Nash equilibria at
least Ω
(
logm
log log logm
)
. The instance used in [18] consists of n jobs and m machines. Each machine j has a
speed αj ≥ 1 with α1 = 1 and each job i has a weight wi. The processing time of job i on machine j is
wij = αjwi (i.e., the inefficiencies of the jobs are the same on the same machine). Now, consider the game
induced by the coordination mechanism BCOORD for the instance that consists of the same machines and
jobs in which the processing time of job i on machine j is defined by w′ij = α
p
p+1
j wi, i.e., the inefficiency of
any job on machine j is α
p
p+1
j . Here, p is the parameter used by BCOORD. By the definition of BCOORD,
we can easily see that the game induced is identical with the game induced by Makespan on the original
instance of [18]. Also note that, in our instance, the processing time of the jobs is not increased (and, hence,
the optimal makespan is not larger than that in the original instance of [18]). Hence, the lower bound of
[18] implies a lower bound on the price of anarchy over mixed Nash equilibria of the game induced by the
coordination mechanism BCOORD.
Our work reveals several other interesting questions. First of all, it leaves open the question of whether
coordination mechanisms with constant approximation ratio exist. In particular, is there any coordination
mechanism that handles anonymous jobs, guarantees that the induced game has pure Nash equilibria, and
has constant price of anarchy? Based on the lower bounds of [8, 25], such a coordination mechanism (if
it exists) must use preemption. Alternatively, is the case of anonymous jobs provably more difficult than
the case where jobs have IDs? Investigating the limits of non-preemptive mechanisms is still interesting.
Notice that AJM-1 is the only non-preemptive coordination mechanism that has approximation ratio o(m)
but it does not guarantee that the induced game has pure Nash equilibria; furthermore, the only known
non-preemptive coordination mechanism that induces a potential game with bounded price of anarchy is
ShortestFirst. So, is there any non-preemptive (deterministic or randomized) coordination mechanism that
is simultaneously o(m)-approximate and induces a potential game? We also remark that Theorem 10 does
not necessarily exclude a game induced by the coordination mechanism BCOORD from having pure Nash
equilibria. Observe that the examples in the proof of Theorem 10 do not consist of best-response moves and,
hence, it is interesting to investigate whether best-response moves converge to pure Nash equilibria in such
games.
Furthermore, we believe that the games induced by the coordination mechanism CCOORD are of in-
dependent interest. We have proved that these games belong to the class PLS [30]. Furthermore, the result
of Monderer and Shapley [40] and the proof of Lemma 13 essentially show that each of these games is
isomorphic to a congestion game. However, they have a beautiful definition as games on parallel machines
that gives them a particular structure. What is the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in such
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games? Even in case that these games are PLS-complete (informally, this would mean that computing a
pure Nash equilibrium is as hard as finding any object whose existence is guaranteed by a potential function
argument) like several variations of congestion games that were considered recently [1, 21, 49], it is still
interesting to study the convergence time to efficient assignments. A series of recent papers [6, 15, 22, 39]
consider adversarial rounds of best-response moves in potential games so that each player is given at least
one chance to play in each round (this is essentially our assumption in Lemma 5 for the coordination mecha-
nism ACOORD). Does the game induced by the coordination mechanism CCOORD converges to efficient
assignments after a polynomial number of adversarial rounds of best-response moves? Although it is a po-
tential game, it does not have the particular properties considered in [6] and, hence, proving such a statement
probably requires different techniques.
Finally, recall that we have considered the maximum completion time as the measure of the efficiency of
schedules. Other measures such as the weighted sum of completion times that is recently studied in [16] are
interesting as well. Of course, considering the application of coordination mechanisms to settings different
than scheduling is an important research direction.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Chien-Chung Huang for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the
paper.
References
[1] H. Ackermann, H. Ro¨glin, and B. Vo¨cking. On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games.
Journal of the ACM, 55(6), 2008.
[2] S. Aland, D. Dumrauf, M. Gairing, B. Monien, and F. Schoppmann. Exact price of anarchy for polynomial
congestion games. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
(STACS), LNCS 3884, Springer, pp. 218-229, 2006.
[3] E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. M. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden. The price of stability
for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM Journal on Computing, 38(4), pp. 1602-1623, 2008.
[4] J. Aspnes, Y. Azar, A. Fiat, S. Plotkin, and O. Waarts. On-line routing of virtual circuits with applications to load
balancing and machine scheduling. Journal of the ACM, 44(3), pp. 486-504, 1997.
[5] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, and A. Epstein. The price of routing unsplittable flow. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 57-66, 2005.
[6] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Epstein, V. S. Mirrokni, and A. Skopalik. Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions
in potential games. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 264-273, 2008.
[7] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, E. F. Grove, M.-Y. Kao, P. Krishnan, and J. S. Vitter. Load balancing in the Lp norm. In
Proceedings of the 36th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 383-391,
1995.
[8] Y. Azar, K. Jain, and V. S. Mirrokni. (Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine schedul-
ing. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 323-332,
2008.
[9] Y. Azar, J. Naor, and R. Rom. The competitiveness of on-line assignments. Journal of Algorithms, 18(2), pp.
221-237, 1995.
[10] I. Caragiannis. Better bounds for online load balancing on unrelated machines. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual
ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 972-981, 2008.
21
[11] I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, and P. Kanellopoulos. Taxes for linear atomic congestion games. ACM Transac-
tions on Algorithms, 7(1), art. 13, 2010.
[12] H.-L. Chen, T. Roughgarden, and G. Valiant. Designing network protocols for good equilibria. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 39(5), pp. 1799-1832, 2010.
[13] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. The price of anarchy of finite congestion games. In Proceedings of the
37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 67-73, 2005.
[14] G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, and A. Nanavati. Coordination mechanisms. Theoretical Computer Science,
410(36), pp. 3327-3336, 2009.
[15] G. Christodoulou, V. S. Mirrokni, and A. Sidiropoulos. Convergence and approximation in potential games. In
Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), LNCS 3884,
Springer, pp. 349-360, 2006.
[16] R. Cole, J. R. Correa, V. Gkatzelis, V. Mirrokni, and N. Olver. Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination
mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 539-548, 2011.
[17] R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden. How much can taxes help selfish routing? Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, 72(3), pp. 444-467, 2006.
[18] A. Czumaj and B. Vo¨cking. Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 3(1),
2007.
[19] C. Du¨rr and T. Nguyen Kim. Personal communication, 2009.
[20] E. Even-Dar, A. Kesselman, and Y. Mansour. Convergence time to Nash equilibria in load balancing. ACM
Transactions on Algorithms, 3(3), 2007.
[21] A. Fabrikant, C. H. Papadimitriou, and K. Talwar. The complexity of pure Nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the
36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 604-612, 2004.
[22] A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, and L. Moscardelli. Speed of convergence in congestion games under best responce
dynamics. In Proceedings of the 35th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
(ICALP), LNCS 5125, Springer, pp. 796-807, 2008.
[23] M. Feldman, M. Rosenthal, and O. Sivan. Makespan minimization through coordination mechanisms.
Manuscript, 2010.
[24] L. Fleischer, K. Jain, and M. Mahdian. Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity networks and
generalized congestion games. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS), pp. 277-285, 2004.
[25] L. Fleischer and Z. Svitkina. Preference-constrained oriented matchings. In Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on
Analytic Algorithmic and Combinatorics (ANALCO), pp. 66-73, 2010.
[26] D. Fotakis, S. Kontogiannis, and P. Spirakis. Selfish unsplittable flows. Theoretical Computer Science, 340(3),
pp. 514-538, 2005.
[27] G. Hardy, J. E. Littlewood, and G. Po´lya. Inequalities. 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1952.
[28] O. H. Ibarra and C. E. Kim. Heuristic algorithms for scheduling independent tasks on nonidentical processors.
Journal of the ACM, 24(2), pp. 280-289, 1977.
[29] N. Immorlica, L. Li, V. S. Mirrokni, and A. Schulz. Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling. Theoretical
Computer Science, 410(17), pp. 1589-1598, 2009.
[30] D. Johnson, C. H. Papadimitriou, and M. Yannakakis. How easy is local search? Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 37, pp. 79-100, 1988.
22
[31] A. C. Kaporis and P. G. Spirakis. The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity
networks and latency functions. Theoretical Computer Science, 410(8-10), pp. 745-755, 2009.
[32] G. Karakostas, and S. Kolliopoulos. Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for heterogeneous selfish users.
In Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 268-276,
2004.
[33] Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Architecting noncooperative networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, 13(7), pp. 1241-1251, 1995.
[34] Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 5(1), pp. 161-173, 1997.
[35] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium
on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), LNCS 1563, Springer, pp. 404-413, 1999.
[36] V. S. Anil Kumar and M. V. Marathe. Improved results for Stackelberg scheduling strategies. In Proceedings of
the 29th Annual International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), LNCS 2380,
Springer, pp. 776-787, 2002.
[37] J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, and E. Tardos. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel ma-
chines. Mathematical Programming, 46, pp. 259-271, 1990.
[38] I. Milchtaich. Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, pp.
111-124, 1996.
[39] V. S. Mirrokni and A. Vetta. Convergence issues in competitive games. In Approximation, Randomization, and
Combinatorial Optimization (APPROX-RANDOM), LNCS 3122, Springer, pp. 183-194, 2004.
[40] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14: 124-143, 1996.
[41] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani. Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press,
2007.
[42] C. H. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games and the internet. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 749-753, 2001.
[43] R. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory,
2, pp. 65-67, 1973.
[44] T. Roughgarden. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM Journal on Computing, 33(2), pp. 332-350, 2004.
[45] T. Roughgarden. On the severity of Braess’s Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 72(5), pp. 922-953, 2006.
[46] T. Roughgarden. Routing games. In [41], Chapter 18, pp. 461-486, 2007.
[47] T. Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anachy. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 513-522, 2009.
[48] P. Schuurman and T. Vredeveld. Performance guarantees of local search for multiprocessor scheduling. IN-
FORMS Journal on Computing, 19(1), pp. 52-63, 2007.
[49] A. Skopalik and B. Vo¨cking. Inapproximability of pure Nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 355-364, 2008.
[50] S. Suri, C. D. Toth, and Y. Zhou. Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games. Algorithmica, 47(1), pp.
77-96, 2007.
[51] C. Swamy. The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games. In Proceedings
of the 18th Annual ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 1133-1142, 2007.
[52] B. Vo¨cking. Selfish load balancing. In [41], Chapter 20, pp. 517-542, 2007.
23
A Proof of Lemma 12
The properties clearly hold if A is empty or k = 1. In the following, we assume that k ≥ 2 and A =
{a1, ..., an} for integer n ≥ 1.
a. Clearly,
L(A)k =
(
k∑
t=1
at
)k
=
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
ζ(d1, ..., dk)
k∏
t=1
adt
where ζ(d1, ..., dk) are multinomial coefficients on k and, hence, belong {1, ..., k!}. The property then
follows by the definition of Ψk(A).
b. We can express Ψk−1(A)k and Ψk(A)k−1 as follows:
Ψk−1(A)
k = ((k − 1)!)k

 ∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
k∏
t=1
adt

k
= ((k − 1)!)k
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk(k−1)≤n
ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
k(k−1)∏
t=1
adt .
Ψk(A)
k−1 = (k!)k−1

 ∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
k∏
t=1
adt

k−1
= (k!)k−1
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk(k−1)≤n
ζ2(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
k(k−1)∏
t=1
adt .
So, both Ψk−1(A)k and Ψk(A)k−1 are sums of all monomials of degree k(k − 1) over the elements of A
with different coefficients. The coefficient ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1)) is the number of different ways to partition
the multiset D = {d1, ..., dk(k−1)} of size k(k − 1) into k disjoint ordered multisets each of size k − 1 so
that the union of the ordered multisets yields the original multiset. We refer to these partitions as (k, k− 1)-
partitions. The coefficient ζ2(d1, ..., dk(k−1)) is the number of different ways to partition D into k − 1
disjoint ordered multisets each of size k (resp. (k − 1, k)-partitions). Hence, in order to prove the property,
it suffices to show that for any multiset {d1, ..., dk(k−1)},
ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
ζ2(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
≤ k
k−1
(k − 1)! . (7)
Assume that some element of D has multiplicity more than one and consider the new multiset D′ =
{d1, ..., d′i, ..., dk(k−1)} that replaces one appearance di of this element with a new element d′i different
than all elements in D. Then, in order to generate all (k, k − 1)-partitions of D′, it suffices to consider the
(k, k−1)-partitions of D and, for each of them, replace di with d′i once for each of the ordered sets in which
di appears. Similarly, we can generate all (k − 1, k)-partitions of D′ using the (k − 1, k)-partitions of D.
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Since the number of sets in (k, k− 1)-partitions is larger than the number of sets in (k− 1, k)-partitions, we
will have that
ζ1(d1, ..., d
′
i, ..., dk(k−1))
ζ2(d1, ..., d′i, ..., dk(k−1))
≥ ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
ζ2(d1, ..., dk(k−1))
.
By repeating this argument, we obtain that the ratio at the left-hand side of inequality (7) is maximized
when all di’s are distinct. In this case, both ζ1 and ζ2 are given by the multinomial coefficients
ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1)) =

 k(k − 1)k − 1, ..., k − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times

 = (k(k − 1))!
((k − 1)!)k
and
ζ1(d1, ..., dk(k−1)) =

 k(k − 1)k, ..., k︸ ︷︷ ︸
k − 1 times

 = (k(k − 1))!
(k!)k−1
and their ratio is exactly the one at the right-hand side of the inequality (7).
c. The property follows easily by the definition of function Ψk by observing that all the monomials of
degree k over the elements of A that contain bt are generated by multiplying bt with the terms of Ψk−t(A).
d. By property (c), we have
Ψk(A ∪ {b}) −Ψk(A) =
k∑
t=1
k!
(k − t)!b
tΨk−t(A)
= kb
k∑
t=1
(k − 1)!
(k − t)! b
t−1Ψk−t(A)
= kb
k−1∑
t=0
(k − 1)!
(k − 1− t)!b
tΨk−1−t(A)
= kbΨk−1(A ∪ {b}).
e. Working with the right-hand side of the inequality and using the definitions of L and Ψk−1, we have
kL(A)Ψk−1(A) = k!
(
n∑
t=1
at
)
·
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk−1≤n
k−1∏
t=1
adt
≥ k!
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
k∏
t=1
adt
= Ψk(A).
The equalities follow obviously by the definitions. To see why the inequality holds, observe that the multi-
plication of the sum of all monomials of degree 1 with the sum of all monomials of degree k − 1 will be a
sum of all monomials of degree k, each having coefficient at least 1.
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f. The proof follows by the derivation below in which we use property (c), the fact that Ψt({b}) = t!bt by
the definition of function Ψt, property (b), and the binomial theorem. We have
Ψk(A ∪ {b}) =
k∑
t=0
k!
(k − t)!b
tΨk−t(A)
=
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Ψk−t(A)Ψt({b})
≤
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Ψk(A)
k−t
k Ψk({b})
t
k
=
(
Ψk(A)
1/k +Ψk({b})1/k
)k
.
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